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This article aims to establish a link between the unemployment dura-
tion and the inter vivos transfers received by the unemployed individuals.
We present a model where the transfer shapes the receiver’s job search
strategy while the donor bases it on the receiver’s unemployment duration.
Ultimately, a recursion arises and leads to a simulteanous determination
of the transfer and the duration. The model aims to apprehend the job
search behaviour in a context where the unemployment compensation sys-
tem is weak or absent, like in some developing countries. We will take Mali
as a study case.
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In the absence of a government distributed unemployment compensation, the
role played by the inter vivos transfers (transfers between living people) in the
job search behaviour of an unemployed individual increases. The other variables
presiding at his decision regarding the job opportunities, mainly the wage dis-
tribution and the job arrival rate, may matter, but they remain exterior while
the transfer is the product of complex interactions between the searcher and
his household environment. The impact of this environment goes beyond the
transfer that only translates its quantitative aspect. It also shapes the searcher’s
preferences regarding the nature of the targeted job(s) and the working condi-
tions, as suggested by Sussman (1965) who asserts that parents’ aid to their
children inﬂuences their occupational choices and their mobility, or by Schwartz
(1967) who argues that gifts (that transfer can also embody) carry along an
identity that the benefactor imposes and that the beneﬁciary accepts. With-
out the state interfering, the role of the household in the recipient’s choices
is exacerbated. In developing countries, like Mali, where the unemployment
compensation system has yet to be developed, the household is at the heart
of the job search strategies. This article aims to introduce a model that shows
its role in the searcher’s preferences and the duration of his unemployment spell.
Though the literature counts works linking agents’ choices on the labour
market to the household environment, unemployment and inter vivos transfers
hardly ﬁnd themselves related. The focus has mainly gone to either bequests
or working recipients. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993), for instance, show a negative
relationship between inheritance, on one hand, and the labour force participa-
tion and labour supply of potential beneﬁciaries, on the other. Bernheim et al.
(1985) found that the bequests are used by the parent as a way to inﬂuence the
child’s behaviour, to obtain his attention and companionship; they show that
the contact between the two increases with the estate of the former. Cox and
Rank (1992), based on a data set (National Survey of Families and Households),
studies the same relationship, but between living people; they concluded that
the transfer is positively related to the income of both the parent and the child.
However, the probability of the transfer occurring is negatively related to the
child’s income. Chami (1998) elaborated a model in which the parent cares
about the child’s eﬀort on the market. That eﬀort that is also a merit good
aﬀects positively the parent’s utility and constitutes a disutility for the child’s.
Our study, though aiming to be in line with the previous by dealing with the
impact of inter vivos transfers on the labour choices, diﬀers by being speciﬁc to
the unemployed recipients. Our model does not particularly aim to show what
motive prevails because it will feature them both. They can both be identiﬁed
in African households through the logics underlying the transfers to the unem-
ployed recipients. First, there is an insurance logic: the contribution ones make
to support the household while employed insures them a substitution income
during inactivity or unemployment periods, allowing them to conserve a con-
stant or acceptable living standard. It entitles them an access to the common
goods (housing, food, healthcare if needed, etc.). Then, there is an assistance
logic that translates a right for the less fortunate to be taken care of. It does not








































1in the community of the benefactors (country, village or family). The two logics
respectively translate exchange and altruism in the household dynamics. They
also make the transfer in the direction of the unemployed household members a
solid substitute for the unemployment beneﬁts, especially when an institution-
alized form of those beneﬁcits is absent. It can therefore replace the beneﬁts
in the same terms as featured in the job search models inspired by the seminal
works of Stigler (1961, 1962), Mortensen (1970) or Lippman and McCall (1976).
In Mali, as generally in Africa, the social construction puts the family at
the centre of the redistribution process that relies on those logics. Generally,
families grow with extensions remaining attached to the core: it is common for
sons to marry and to stay in the parental home, while the daughters that marry
move into other familial homes. This results in a community of mutualisation.
Thought the Malian society shows signs of modernization, the extensive form
of family remains dominant. The institutional backwardness seems to be the
obvious cause; people rely on their family because the structures to turn to are
not developed1. 81% of the unemployed respondents of a 2007 household survey
(DOEF, 2008) declared to be supported by their family; in a 2004 household
survey (DOEF, 2004), that share was 79%. In informal interactions such as
transfers, the line between the insurance and the assistance appears blurry, just
as much as it is between exchange and altruism. Our model will attempt to
capture them both.
In the section 2, we present a time-contingent model that relates the level
of the transfer to the duration of the recipient’s unemployment spell. We spec-
ify the utility functions of both of the protagonists: the donor’s function will
show the presence of both of the motives whereas the recipient’s function will
integrate the job search model. An equationns system arises from the two
functions, translating the strategic game that takes place between the two in-
dividuals. Section 3 presents the data and explores the descriptive statistics
on the surveyed population. In the section 4, we comment the results of the
instrumented regression and conclude with the section 5.
2 The framework
2.1 A time-contingent transfer model
It makes no doubt that unemployment is a major event in a person’s life and
that it leads to changes2. The nature and the impact of these changes, however,
depend on the prior rules shaping the person’s environment. Therefore, the
assumptions that are made on those rules determine the behaviour of an un-
employed individual. In the African family case, the community life establishes
1Points of view may diverge on the cause. Stark (1995), for instance, suggests that the
family predominance in the redistribution process in developing countries is not due to an
institutional backwardness, but, on the contrary, explains it. It is because the family transfers
are eﬃcient that the market institutions fail to emerge.
2In the literature, the impact of changes is neglected, as noted by Bhaumik (2001). His
critic of previous empirical studies in the literature, such as the ones by Cox (1987) or Altonji
et al. (1992), pointed out how they entirely attached the transfers to the incomes of individuals,
neglecting the events in the recipient’s life when those events (child birth, marriage, divorce,








































1reciprocity as a foundation of the interactions. With the rights, come along
duties. That reciprocity does not alienate the aﬀections that link the household
members, the household being more or less a family. We introduce a model
that allows reciprocity as a part of intergenerational transfers while relating the
transfer to the exterior environment, that is to say the donor’s opinion of the
beneﬁciary’s eﬀort to create the conditions for a payback. Unemployment be-
ing a disturbing circumstance in the scheme, the donor’s gesture in the present
depends on his opinion as to whether or not the beneﬁciary will be able to in-
tegrate the solidarity chain.
Consider two agents, the donor (say the parent), i, and the recipient, j (the
unemployed child). We write the additively separable utility function of the
donor:
Ui = Ui(Ci) + t−µβUj(Cj) (1)
The budget contraint is Ci = Yi − T, Ci and Yi being respectively the donor’s
consumption and income and T, the transfer. The impact of the recipient’s
utility i is weighted by two parameters: β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1), the level of altruism
on i’s part, and t−µ, the impact of time of the donor’s sensitivity to the re-
cipient’s consumption. While t is the duration of the transfer, taken on some
regular basis (weekly, monthly, annually, etc), µ depends on i’s subjective ap-
preciation of the environment. It primarily depends on the recipient’s position
in the intergenerational chain, which informs the donor on his capacity (or his
likelihood) to reimburse the transfer. Its level cannot be the same for children,
who ﬁt the recipient stage, as for young adults, who enter the middle stage,
or as for more mature people, who are closer the retirement stage. Since the
focus of our study is going to be on the young adults (45.63% of the unemployed
respondents are or less than 25 years old while 62.86% are under 30), we can say
that the transfers can be consider as an abnormal extension of the ﬁrst stage.
Every period of outgoing transfer towards an unemployed recipient furthers the
donor from the likelihood of receiving back as much as transferred (unless the
recipient’s future incomes turn out to be high enough to compensate the cut on
the payback period). The longer it takes the donor to have a job, the longer the
donor will have to wait before the repayment starts and the lesser the periods
of reimbursement. The donor can only adjust by increasing the ”family interest
rate” speciﬁc to the recipient. Consequently, the duration aﬀects the arbitration
in disfavour of the transfer. The sign of µ is therefore negative. Its determi-
nants can also include parameters regarding the immediate economic context;
the donor can take into account the economic climate and lessen the impact of









There are two advantages to introducing time. First, it results in disso-
ciating between β, that translates the donor’s aﬀection towards the recipient,
and the transfer, that, so far, materialized this altruism. The transfer can vary
with β remaining constant. It reacts inversely to the unemployment duration,
the lengthening of which causes a decrease of the right-hand term of the equa-








































1therefore his consumption decreasing, or/and by the donor’s marginal utility de-
creasing, therefore his consumption increasing. Second, it alleviates the moral
hazard problem that arises in this conﬁguration. The time-contingency of the
transfer deters the recipient from lengthening (needlessly) the unemployment
duration3. The duration, by relating the level (and maybe the nature) of the
transfer to the labour market conditions as experienced or/and processed by
the recipient, provides the donor with a means to bring the recipient to behave
responsibly. Our donor, in that regard, ﬁts the Sussman (1953) description of
parents who, though they do not hesitate to help their children, except respon-
sible behaviour from them.
Now, we write the function of the recipient:
Uj = Uj(Cj) + t−φUj(e) (3)
Cj is the recipient’s consumption, e, the level of eﬀort expanded in the job
search and t−φ, the impact of time on the search disutility. The disutility is
an increasing and diﬀerentiable function. As in the donor’s function, t is the
duration on a stable basis and φ, the reaction of the disutility to the duration
of the job search. If, during the job search, the recipient’s skills at exploring
the market, identifying job opportunities and applying at them increase, then
the marginal disutility is bound to decrease and the sign of the parameter,
to be negative. We embrace that conﬁguration because it supposes an agent
that learns by doing and familiarizes with a market that might nevertheless be
subjected to changes.
The recipient too has a budget, Cj ≤ T + wr, that conditions the maxi-
mization of his utility. This constraint is particular. We exclude any exoge-
nous income, the inclusion of which would assume the ownership of an estate
or assets by the recipient, which, in its turn, might make the transfer need-
less. As for the reservation wage, wr, primarily dependant on the individual’s
characteristics (age, education, skills, etc.), its relationship with the eﬀort is
ambiguous. The eﬀort might lead to its occurrence in the constraint, just like
the failure to do so may lead the recipient to reconsider the level of the wage
or of the eﬀort, but the reaction, we
r), is not systematic. The impact of the
eﬀort on the wage is integrated to the latter’s relationship with the duration
(we
r = we
t), since the adjustments the recipient may proceed to happen over
the course of the unemployment. The derivation of the Lagrangian function,








The reservation wage obeys the same logic as in its usual representation in
which it equalizes the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal disutil-
ity of the job search poursuit. If we consider that the latter from the utility
3The moral hazard remains somehow because the recipient can still conceal the status
changes, a job obtainment or the related income, that might occur in order to keep receiving
the transfers. The donor can adjust by taking into account the work eﬀort that is translated
into the recipient’s income. Since that scenario and ours mutually exclude each other - the
recipient either has a job or is seeking for one -, we do not need to integrate the strategy








































1expected from the futur employment, then the logic remains here.
With the two maximizations, we obtain two points of view on the same



















Given that the recipient’s consumption is ﬁnanced (exclusively) by the trans-
fer, we can deduce the derivate of his utility function in the ﬁrst equation and

















The ﬁrst equation expresses the transfer while the second translates the
unemployment duration. The transfer appears under diﬀerent forms in the two
equations. In the ﬁrst, it hides in the recipient’s consumption function that
it ﬁnances until a successful outcome of the search. The marginal utility of
consumption decreases when the transfer increases and vice-versa, making it an
inverse function of (an unspeciﬁed but increasing and positive function of) the
transfer:
Uc
j = [f1(T)]−1 = f
−1
1 (T) (7)
In the second equation, the transfer appears in the reservation wage. Given
that the transfer is the searcher’s sole non labour income, it holds the place of
unemployment beneﬁts in that wage:






where λ is the arrival rate of job opportunities, ρ, the discount rate (of the
searcher not the donor) and F(w), the wages distribution. Based on the transfer
variation over the duration, it can be said that the environment is not stationary
(Van den Berg, 1990). Nevertheless, the fact that the donor cannot access
information on the job search creates a compartmentalization that would make
this non stationarity partial if the job arrival rate and the wage distribution
were to be constant. That constance would have the transfer explain the entire
variation of the reservation wage. If the exterior determinants vary, the wage
and the transfer would still be ﬂuctuating in the same direction, unless the
exterior impact outweights the eﬀect of the transfer. It can be asserted that this
is unlikely because the arrival rate decreases as the unemployment spell lasts.
Employers read in the duration a signal of the individual’s skill deterioration.
The less attractiveness of the individual’s labour supply results in a lower job
arrival rate.
If we suppose a partial stationarity (which favours the stability of µ and φ),
the reservaton wage can be expressed as:























































By rearranging the variables in a manner that showcases the duration in the
















The logarithmic development make the negative relationship between the
unemployment duration and the transfered amount more obvious.
 
−ln(f1(T)) = µln(t) + ln(U
c
i ) + ln(β)
(µ + φ)ln(t) = −ln(f2(T)) − ln(−Ue
j) − ln(Uc
i ) + ln(β)
(12)
Based on the system, we can say that time deteriorates the donor’s generosity
towards the job searcher while a high level of transfer favours a lengthening of
the uneployment duration.
We develop now the utility functions. For the donor, let us consider that
the utility function is linear
Ui(C) = X′
iβi + ωi (13)
X′
i is a set of variables relative to the donor, covering as well the aspects of
the household environment (size of the household, his position in the hierarchy,
other members’ income, etc.) as the market conditions (social and professional
category, activity sector, wage, job security, etc.). As for ωi, it is the error term
in the estimation of the utility. Given that, Ui = X′
iβi+ωi = ln(exp(X′
iβi+ωi)),
the marginal utility of consumption can be expressed as4:
Uc
i = (exp(X′
iβi + ωi))−1 (14)
The job search disutility for the recipient can be developed too. Here, one
can consider that the time spent on the search could constitute an indicator of
the eﬀort, but that would be misleading. The information asymmetry prevents
the donor from knowing the use made of that time and of the means used as
well. The wage distribution, however, shows some reliability in that regard.
Its stability allows asserting that the higher wage the searcher demands, the
smaller the opportunities. Inversely, the lower he is willing to go in his demands,
the more he expands his opportunities. When we consider that the eﬀort is
embodied in the information gathering and processing the searcher has to go
through before applying at a job (drawing from the wage distribution), we can









































1say that the unemployed individual with low wage demands will bear less search
disutility, everything equal (including time), than someone who is demanding
high. The wage have to be excluded from the information package, since the
searcher is not supposed to know it. However, the characteristics of the job do
not have to be. Therefore, we can consider that:
−Uj(e) = Z′
jγj + ωj (15)
Z′
j represents a set of variables concerning the job targeted by the recipient and
his attitude towards the labour market (professional status, targeted sector,
income regularity and stability, proximity of the job location, hours, willingness
to adjust the demands if the duration lengthens, etc.) and ωj, the error term
of the equation. The marginal disutility of the search eﬀort is:
−Ue
j = (exp(Z′
jγj + ωj))−1 (16)
With, these speciﬁcations, we can rewrite the system:
 
ln(f1(T)) = −µln(t) − ln((exp(X′
iβi + ωi))−1) − ln(β)
(µ + φ)ln(t) = −ln(f2(T)) − ln((exp(Z′
jγj + ωj))−1) − ln(Uc
i ) + ln(β)
(17)
and end up with:
 
ln(f1(T)) = −µln(t) + X′
iβi + ωi − ln(β)
(µ + φ)ln(t) = −ln(f2(T)) + (Z
′
jγj + ωj) + (X
′
iβi + ωi) + ln(β)
(18)
We notice an asymmetrical impact of the agents on one another: while the
job search disutility is absent from the donor’s function, the donor’s consump-
tion is present in the recipient’s function. That presence is independent of the
transfer, which is separately expressed. The recipient being egoist, the donor’s
real consumption only aﬀects him through the transfer. The presence of that
consumption rather translates the way the conditions the donor, directly or in-
directly, surrounds the recipient with determine his preferences on the labour
market. The children tend to be drawn to the same professions as their par-
ents; they search in their jobs the same (or some of the) characteristics as of
their parents’. The duration equation, therefore, depends on the variables of
the transfer equation (Zj = (Xi|Zj)) though the transfer equation remains inde-
pendent from the variables determining the duration (Xi = Xi). Knowing that
β is stable, it integrates the constant of the equation, giving k, and considering
that Uc
i can be read through Z′
jγj, we can say:
 
ln(f1(T)) = −µln(t) + X
′
iβi + ki + ωi
(µ + φ)ln(t) = −ln(f2(T)) + Z′
jγj + kj + υj
(19)
where υ is a linear function lin´ eaire of the two error terms.
2.2 Remarks on the model
We can make ﬁve remarks on the model, related as much to its advantages as








































1First, the model sets in line with the recursive relation between the unem-
ployment duration and the non labour resources of the unemployed and, by
extension, between the former and the reservation wage. It strays from the
compensatory logic present in the Becker (1974) rotten-kid model5 where the
transfer reacts positively to the donor’s income (∂T/∂Yi > 0) et negatively to
the recipient’s (∂T/∂Yj < 0). Here, the transfer determines the searcher’s pref-
erences and strategies on the market and allows him, if high, the manoeuvre to
seek for jobs that match better his aspirations. It sustains the reservation wage
and lengthens the duration, to which it reacts, in return. The donor using it as
the only signal (though t is the only parameter we introduce, we can consider
that µ brings in some additional elements) of the progress of the search and of
the recipient’s likelihood of integrating the intergenerational solidarity chain, it
restricts the searcher’s option.
Second, it is noticeable that the eﬀort is absent from the donor’s function.
In that regard, our model diﬀers from the one by Chami (1998). In that model,
the eﬀort is present twice in the donor’s function: directly, as a ”merit good”,
and indirectly, through the recipient’s function. In our case, the information
asymmetry prevents the donor from knowing the eﬀort. Since the eﬀort does
not (systematically) result in an income that might alleviate the transfer, the
signal that informs the donor on the recipient market strategies (preferences,
means used, time spent on the search, etc.) disappears. By considering solely
the unemployment duration, the donor embraces fully this information limi-
tation and tries to overcome it. The time-contingency of the transfer is not
necessarily prejudicial to the beneﬁciary if the donor takes into account the
market parameters in the evaluation of µ. We end up with an impure altruism
model. The exchange motive based on the eﬀort show more suitability for an
African society than one based on a care giving quid pro quo. The transfer
could be linked to the attention and care given to the donor, as in the model
by Cox (1987), but then the unemployed individual would have to compensate
the income lack with a participation at the service production. When that pro-
duction is more representative of a sexual division of the labour, as in African
societies, than it is of a quid pro quo, the model might lead to erroneous con-
clusions. Based on our data set, it appears that the weekly amount of time
spent on household production is only 2.63 hours for men (in our sample) while
coming close to 20 hours for women. That illustrates women’s specialization
in the household production, whether it is primarily aimed to beneﬁt a donor
or not. Therefore, the service model may fail to apprehend correctly the context.
Third, compared to the mutualism model, whose central idea we used, the
model is less restrictive. In that model, also know as the ”family constitution”
model or ”the child as old-age security” model, parents transfer to their oﬀ-
spring, as an investment for their old days, while ﬁnancing the grandparents
retirement, as a payback for the prior transfer by those. A game, embracing
more or less this logic, is proposed by Samuelson (1958) where every genera-
tion’s retirement is ﬁnanced by its predecessor. It lacks, however, precisions as
for the investment that must be prior to the giving back. This model oﬀers
5Laferr` ere and Wolﬀ (2005) give a portrait the literature on the subject. They present the








































1a likely portrait of African families. Parents take care of the children hoping
they will return the favour. That idea explains the reproduction behaviour: in
addition of establishing a man’s virility, the number of his children translates
the ﬁnancial and material security he can hope for in his old days. Despite
of its strength in terms of likelihood, the model hardly makes a room for an
unemployed member. It isolates the participants by assuming a similarity of
preferences over the contracting generations, which means that they arbitrate
in favour in participating regardless of the exterior parameters, whether better
or less attractive. Their preferences are impervious to those parameters that
are ignored or neglected. That makes the model unﬁt to approach the link that
might exist between that environment and the unemployed participant’s situa-
tion. Moreover, the contract entirely dissociates the transfer, whether incoming
or outgoing, from the participants’ income (the altruism model does not), pro-
nouncing its unﬁtness for our study. The separation between these elements
may result from the certainty that for every transfer there is a payback, mainly
because it supposes that the rules presiding at the transfers are unanimously
dictated and that there is a punishment system for defectors. An individual who
fails to transfer to the preceding generation exempts the following generation
from any obligation of transfer to him. Any failure to comply with the constitu-
tion results in an exclusion. This rule, necessary for the model survival, empties
it out of any aﬀections when only those can maintain the intergenerational (and
also intragenerational) solidarity despite of failures. In our model, the solidarity
chain remains vital in the donor’s decision but he makes it less categorical. That
adjustment conserves the insurance spirit, but does not evacuate the assistance,
which can come through altruisme (β) or even empathy µ.
Fourth, our model does not give the family transfer a systematic superiority
over the market transactions in terms of information. There can be found many
arguments in favour of the inter vivos transfers (we can mention Ben-Porath
(1980) and Pollak (1985)) as a preferable option when compared to the market
transactions, especially when the transfers are approached in an intertemporal
manner (Cox and Japelli (1990)). In the household environment, the moral haz-
ard and adverse selection risks are supposed to be smaller due to the closeness
that allows for the donor to have a solid knowledge of the recipient’s situation
and, therefore, to make an informed decision. Moreover, the mutual trust and
informality that it favours should reduce the transaction costs for both parties.
Our model does not translate the closeness in terms of knowledge because the
job search takes place on a territory that is outside the donor’s supervision. The
constant adjustment of the transfer to the unemployment duration illustrates
that.
And ﬁnally, it must be noted that, in all likelihood, the impact of the dura-
tion on the transfer cannot be indeﬁnite. Though it cannot be asserted whether
the transfer decrease over the unemployment duration is due to slow down, re-
curring facts sustain the thesis of a minimal level for transfer, insensitive of the
duration. It can be identiﬁed as the non monetary advantages the job searcher
can access unconditionally (housing, food, healthcare in case of need, etc.), be-
cause beneﬁciary an invariable aﬀection from the donor or the community of
benefactors. As mentionned previously, many unemployed individuals are ﬁ-










































We will implement the model on the data of a 2004 household survey (Enquˆ ete
Permanente Aupr` es des M´ enages) conducted by the Malian employment agency
(Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi6). The survey concerned 2,500 households on
the entire territory, 180 of which resided in Bamako, the capital, 320, in other
urban areas, while 2,000 lived in rural regions. It aimed to collect information on
the labour market in order to make reliable estimations of the labour indicators
and to guide the employment policies. The questions were primarily designed
to inform on the respondents’ labour market situation and their working condi-
tions such as their wage (level, regularity, variance, etc.), their status (employed,
inactive or unemployed), their institutional sector (formal or informal) etc., but
they also took an interest in their household environment through variables such
as the household size, the marriage regime (monogamous or polygamous), the
members non labour income (estate, transfers, remittances, etc).
Based on the conceptual deﬁnition of unemployment (an individual who is
not working, is available for a job and is seeking for one), we count in the dataset
412 observations matching an unemployment status. We took into account the
age restriction, the age bracket being 15-64, so to be in line with the oﬃcial
ﬁgures. Amongst the unemployed respondents, 359 informed on their unem-
ployment duration while 327 (79%) declared to be supported by their family.
In that population, only 238 individuals gave an estimation of the transfer they
monthly receive from the family members (mainly the head of household). And
of that groupe, only 140 simultaneously gave a precise number concerning the
duration of the current unemployment (in months) along with information on
other variables. They make our sample; the small size explains our rather re-
stricted choice in variables.
3.2 Variables
We will, in a ﬁrst place, use a Double Square Least Stage method (2SLS) to
estimate the equation, and then, given that we use cross sectional data with
which heteroscedasticity is inevitable, we will use the Generalized Moments
Method (GMM).
3.2.1 The transfer equation
There are three categories of variables in the transfer equation (ln(T), T is in
Franc Cfa7):
• The household labour incomes (FCFA): we associated with each individual
the sum of the household members’ labour income. This choice reﬂects
6The report (DOEF, 2004) on that survey is available on the agency Internet site,
www.anpe-mali.org.








































1less any income pooling hypothesis - in fact, the majority or the totality
of that income is brought in by the head of household - than it allows
us to includes the few individuals whose family’s bread winner was the
household head’s wife or an elder sibling;
• The non labour incomes (FCFA): we applied the same principal. Though
all the resources have been taken into account (monthly rent on real estate,
interests on ﬁnancial assets, alimony for the divorced, pension for the
retirees, etc.), the heart of this variable resided in the remittances, a vital
source of income for Malian families. We also included the interhousehold
transfers, within the country but, most of the time, between diﬀerent
locations as the case of oﬀsprings who move out or to another town but
send some money back home;
• The position in the family hierarchy: we also included dummy variables
on the individuals’ position in the family order (head of household, spouse
of the ”head”, child of the ”head”, nephew or niece, etc.). These variables
allow apprehending the importance of the social and cultural construction;
• Gender and residency area: we ﬁnally took into account the gender and
the living area of the individual.
3.2.2 The duration equation
In the duration equation (ln(t), t is in months), we mobilized the variables con-
cerning the individual’s strategies on the market. We excluded the reservation
wage, which is already present through the transfer, to avoid colinearity and we
mainly relied on dummy variables informing on those strategies. We considered:
• The type of the job: through this variable, we will highlight the prefer-
ence for the wage earning jobs (as opposed to self-employment), whose
popularity is related to their stability and the regularity of the income;
• The work time: we included the amount of time the searcher wishes to
work weekly and how the preference between the fulltime (35 hours and
more) and the part-time (less than 35 hours) aﬀects the duration;
• Sectors: we considered the targeted sector (public service, state-owned
ﬁrms or private sector);
• Finally, we considered that the duration depends on the labour market
pressure. We therefore introduced the unemployment rate in diﬀerent
forms, each carrying a hypothesis on the information asymmetry between
the recipient and the donor. The use of the age-bracket speciﬁc rate
(ln(Ua)) - we took ﬁve-year-wide brackets - assumes that the the market
pressure that may harden the recipient’s chances at employment has no
impact whatsoever on the donor’s income or transfer. The youth of the
unemployed population and the considerable role of the household head
in the transfer suggest an age diﬀerence that helps this hypothesis. With
the region speciﬁc rate (ln(Uj)), the donor may not be completely isolated
from the pressure that is considered, but his relative exposure to that








































1not lead to systematic dismiss. With the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we will
see how the hypotheses aﬀect the model.
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Before we present the results and comment, it is necessary to explore the statis-
tics so to describe the unemployed individuals’ environment. The variable that
oﬀers a multidimensional glimpse at that environment is the household labour
income.
First, that income, dominated by the household head’s income (0.98 of the
total as noted in table 2), informs in many ways on the ”head’s” proﬁle, which,
in turn, explains the searcher’s preferences. The ”head’s” income is correlated
to his status on the labour market8. Agents from the formal sector earn more
than those in the informal segment of the economy. The former are mainly
composed of executives and middle management agents (whether in the ad-
ministration, the state-owned ﬁrms or in the private companies) while among
the latter, the majority is self-employed. Due to that correlation between the
income and the professional status, we excluded that latter from the variables
list. The income also carries information about the ”head’s” age, to which it
is positively correlated. That relation is intertwined with the category because
the ”formal agents” who earn more are 40 years old in average (44 for the civil
servants (DOEF, 2003, 2007), 38 for the private sector agents) whereas the av-
erage is between 28 and 30 for the ”informal agents”.
Second, we note that the household labour income shows a positive corre-
lation (0.33) to the household size. This relation cannot be interpreted as a
result of the ”head’s” or the head couple’s reproductive behaviour since the
size includes the extended family members. It rather means that the members
tend to concentrate around the person who succeeds professionally and makes a
good living. That concentration is an outstanding characteristic of the Malian
society. It disguises as well a ”survival community” - the non-working and un-
employed family members have no other choice but to turn to the resourceful
members for support - as it translates an intergenerational solidarity, vertical
and horizontal - the ”one-who-made-it” is seen (sometimes actually is) as return
on investment from the family or the community, the investment going from ac-
tual material support to blessings (the Malian society has a belief system, Islam
or the old traditions, that attributes some virtues to the elder’s blessings) -.
The support ﬁnds a justiﬁcation on both parties. If the head of household were
not predominant in the income, the correlation would rather illustrate a ”choice
community” because the household would be a group of independent and re-
sourceful individuals who could live separately but chose to live together. In
such case, and if the data allowed, a multi donor model would have ﬁtted better.
Third, we notice a positive correlation between the household income and
the level of education of the unemployed person (0.10). That relation illustrates
a social reproduction. The parents’ income, essentially the head’s, linked to
their own education level, favours the trajectory of their oﬀspring in school,
as much in terms of advancement as in terms of orientation. The individuals
8This paragraph is based on the comments of a study estimating the wage curve on the








































1whose household head works in public administration reveal a distinctive pref-
erence for public service and the wage earning jobs. As for those from a private
agent (formal or informal sector) leading household, their preference goes to
entrepreneurship; they want to work in small or middle sized ﬁrms. The con-
clusion we draw from the income in the estimation can therefore be related to
all those aspects of the searcher’s environment.
4 Results and Comments
4.1 Methodology and Speciﬁcation Tests
The basic model is built around the transfer. The equation includes the unem-
ployment duration and the aforementioned variables. The OLS regression (1)
is presented in the table 3. We notice an elasticity of 0.12, meaning that a 10%
increase of the unemployment duration leads to a 1.2% decrease of the amount
of transfer. Though this result conforms to the prediction of the model, it is
necessary to test its econometric robustness. The determination coeﬃcient of
the regression is 0.309, meaning that the model allows to explain almost the
third of the transfer variance. Moreover, we found that the null hypothesis of
variables omission can be rejected because we found a statistic F(3;127) = 1.08
with a p-value of 0.362. The basic model seems therefore strong9. Nevertheless,
it remains to test the hypothesis of simulteanous determination which, if veriﬁed
will imply a non convergence of the OLS estimators. The simultaneity involves
a correlation between the unemployment duration and the error term of the
transfer equation, which illustrates the impact of the duration on the transfer.
To test this hypothesis, we need instrumental variables that would explain a
part of the duration that is independent from the transfer but correlated to the
error term. The choice of variables depends on the hypothesis we make about
the information asymmetry between the donor and the recipient. In (2), we
added the unemployment rate to the list of instrumental variables. We took a
rate speciﬁc to the recipient’s age bracket, which diﬀers from the age bracket of
the donor. The market pressure is included, but the age circonscription isolates
the donor from it.
A ﬁrst test of the instruments quality can be read in their capacity to explain
the variance of the instrumented variable. The determination coeﬃcient is only
7.54%, showing that we have weak instruments. However, the equation is solid
because the RESET test shows that the null hypothesis of variables omission
can be rejected. We obtained a statistic F(3;127) = 1,57 and a p-value around
0.19910. This shows that, despite of their weakness, the instruments justify a
poursuit of the estimation.
We included then the predicted values of the unemployment duration in the
basic model. In (3), we can notice that the determination coeﬃcient remains
practically at the same level: 31,3% against 30,9% before. Therefore, the in-
struments are consistent. We proceeded with the Hausman test, aiming to show
whether the instrumented variable is endogenous or exogenous. We introduced
9The Breushc-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test show that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity
can be rejected. We obtain a statistic of 1.18 for a 0.278 p-value.
10We also found that the regression is heteroscedastic because the null hypothesis can be








































1in the basic regression the residues from an auxiliary equation, which is the re-
gression of the duration on all the variables (instrumental and exogenous). The
augmented equation (4) we obtained shows the same coeﬃcients as the 2SLS
regression (5), the diﬀerences appearing the standard errors. The coeﬃcient of
the residue strays slightly away from the nullity hypothesis with a p-value at
0.101. This value being practically equal to the 10% level, we can reject the null
hypothesis of the Hausman test and accept that the duration is endogenous. The
Wu-Hausman statistic conﬁrms the same thing; for a level of F(1,129) = 2,728
its p-value is 0.101. As for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic following a χ2 law,
it converges with a p-value of 0.089 for 2.899. We can accept the postulate of a
simulteanous determination of the transfer and the unemployment duration in
the Malian case. We tested the instruments furthermore with a Sargan test and
obtained a statistic inferior to a χ2 (0,90 ; 8) = 10,057. The null hypothesis of
this inferiority cannot be rejected because the p-value is 0.261. The strength the
instruments show despite of their weak role in explaining the duration suggests
that the hypotheses underlying their choice is to be examined closely.
We therefore adopted modes of instrumenting. The results are presented
in the table 4. We can notice that the elasticity level varies depending on
the instruments, especially the unemployment rate we choose. With the age-
bracket speciﬁc rate of unemployment, the elasticity is -0.436. The high level
of this elasticity, when compared to the OLS estimated leve (-0.116), can be
interpreted as the consequence of a diﬀerence of µ accross the donor population.
When the donor does not dismiss the labour market pressures (as experienced by
the donor) as an explanatory element of the unemployment duration, µ is likely
to be aﬀected of the donor’s empathy, which varies from one donor to another,
impacting ultimately the transfer response to the duration lengthening.
With the unemployment rate of the region (also taking into the diﬀerence
between the urban and rural areas of the considered region), the elasticity is
0,328. The lower level of this elasticity (3), when compared to (4) translates less
a convergence of information treatment among the donors - one can assume that
the information on the general economic climate is more accessible than it is on
an age class; therefore the donor can rely less on empathy and more on facts -
than it translates a direct impact of the market pressure on the donor’s income.
The regional unemployment rate may aﬀect the donor’s income (through the
wage curve); therefore its instrumental quality is compromized11. That explain
why the model fail the Hausman test. The p-value is 15%, making it hard to
reject the null hypothesis that states that the duration is exogenous.
With the unemployment rate that is simultaneously speciﬁc to the age class
and the residency area (ln(Uaj)), we found results reﬂecting a position between
the two former speciﬁcations. The elasticity is 0.410 whereas the p-value is 11%
for the Hausman test. The Sargan test is conclusive with a 10.72 statistic and
a 0218 p-value.
11The regional unemployment rate could have been used as a direct exogenous variable in
the transfer equation, but that would have assumed that the transfer reaction to the regional
labour market pressure is systematic. That would require the stability of all the other variables
in X′
i, which cannot be accepted since those variables are correlated to the labour income,










































1We noted that the equations are heteroscedastic. The null hypothesis of the
error terms equality across the obsservations can be rejected for both of the in-
terest variables. We cannot determine a precise cause for the heteroscedasticity
because we notice disparities between diﬀerent groups (men and women; rural
and urbain inhabitants). To correct the heteroscedasticity, we use the GMM to
re-estimate the system. The results are in the table 5.
5 Comments
5.1 The unemployment duration
The GMM improves the models without altering the results. We notice a neg-
ative relation between the transfer and the unemployment duration. The in-
dividuals who have lasted longer in unemployment declared, everything equal,
lower amounts of transfer than the unemployed who newly arrived in the job
search arena. The relationship between the transfer and the duration can be
intuitively deduced from the average unemployment durations in the table 1.
When the observations are restricted to the transfers recipients, the unemploy-
ment duration is 58 months in average; it rises to 71 months when they are
extended to the non receiving individuals. This proves that the duration lead
to the disappearance of the transfer. By introducing second order polynomial
term of the unemployment duration in the regression, we obtained a minimum12
set around the 54th month of unemployment. After four years and half in un-
employment, the unemployed individuals stop receiving transfers, though their
family still keep supporting them. That conﬁrms the suggestion of the ﬁfth
remark on the model. There is a minimum level for the transfer, translated in
the unconditional access to common goods of the household13.
Moreover, it can be noticed that with the GMM resultats that the elastic-
ities converge. The elasticities of the instrumental speciﬁcations including the
age-bracket speciﬁc rate of unemployment, the regional rate of unemployment
and the age bracket and region speciﬁc rate of unemployment are respectively
-0.392, -0.373 and -0.352. Based on the solidity of the speciﬁcation with the un-
employment rate of the recipient’s age bracket, we can say that a 10% increase
in the unemployment duration lead to a transfer decrease neighouring 4%. We
can say that this elasticity is entirely subordinated to the household dynamics
because the heterogeneity across the population has been controled in its main
forms: the gender-based and the area-based gaps. In the table 1, it can be seen
that men a more favoured in the transfers than women while their unemployed
duration is lower. Their duration is 38 months in average against 77 months for
women (50.6% less). In terms of transfer, they obtain 50% more than women;
they receive on average FCFA 16,500 per month, quite above the level FCFA
12With the second order polynomial term, the coeﬃcient is b = −0.687 (p-value = 0.011)
and the squared term is a = 0.0859 (p-value =0.029). The minimum is: ∆ = − b
2a = 4. To
switch to month, we calculated: exp(4) = 54.
13By choosing to read in the absence of a declaration about the transfer a depletion of
the compensation privileges, we kept from using a Heckman method to correct the selection
bias. That would certainly have broadened the sample, but the variables used in the correction
process would have conditioned the relationship between the transfer and the duration, making








































110,971 women rely on to support themselves. There are also spatial diﬀerences
between the individuals of the sample. The urban areas living unemployed indi-
viduals monthly receive FCFA 14,615 while their average duration is 52 months
whereas their rural counterparts settle for FCFA 11,194 per month during a
longer period, 76 months. The maintining of the negative sign (and the results
of the tests) illustrates that the hypothesis of a negative relationship between
the transfer and the unemployment holds in the case of Mali, even when the
individual heterogeneities are taken into account.
5.1.1 The household incomes
The impact of the household labour income is positive (OLS : 1.18e-7 ; 2SLS
(Ua) = 1.44e-07 ; GMM (Ua) = 1.58e-07**). Its signiﬁcance depends on the
speciﬁcation while to coeﬃcient fails often the alternative hypothesis. That can
be linked to the insuﬃciencies of the data. On the 2,500 households surveyed,
less than 400 declarations on the labour income of the household head were
collected. That leaves out a substantial share of households. Many individuals
did not communicate an income either because it was not stable or because they
do not keep counts (mainly the self-employed).
Based on the income relation to the household head’s professional category,
we can generally say that an unemployed individual with a household head work-
ing in the formal sector has a more protected ”unemployment compensation”
than one whose household head is in the informal sector. As we can noticed
in the table 1, the transfers are high when the ”head” is a boss or upper level
management (FCFA 23,333) or a middle management (FCFA 29,000). These
two categories count more people from the private sector than from the public
sector, though few agents can be count among the middle management. The
public sector agents are more present among the executives who distribute a
more moderate transfer (FCFA 11,700). Their level is inferior to the transfers
distributed by self-employed “heads” (FCFA 11,929).However, their unemployed
household members have a shorter unemployment duration, 27 months against
52 months.
A ﬁrst explanation can come from the geographic diﬀerences. The formal
sector is concentrated in urban areas - especially Bamako -, where the unem-
ployment duration is lower, while the informal sector has a major presence in
the country where the duration is high. The second explanation is related to the
networks the unemployed members can access through the household head. The
job searchers are more likely to embrace those networks when they lead to se-
cure jobs, as in the formal, than when they keep them unstable and low-waged
jobs, as in the informal. The third reason for the duration diﬀerence is the
searcher’s own characteristics. The positive relationship between the ”head’s”
income and the searcher’s level of education means that the searchers from a
household led by a formal working head are more likely to have a higher level
of education and, therefore, to be oﬀered a larger range of opportunities on the
labour market than those from an informal agent led household.
The non labour incomes have a higher and stronger coeﬃcient (OLS : 1.08e-
06** ; 2SLS (Ua) = 1.35e-06** ; GMM (Ua) = 1.50e-06***). The importance
of the remittances in that variable suggests that the labour market strategies of








































1the distance between those households and the one the individual belongs in).
That importance links the level and the nature of the transfer to a relationship
that can go beyond the donor and the recipient; it involves the relationship
between the receiving member’s household and the giving member’s households
belonging. That relationship being exterior to the household dynamics presiding
at the rules of transfers (level, origin and peridicity of the remittances, for
instance), we do not have the necessary information to interpret the coeﬃcient
in a direction that can characterize that relationship.
5.1.2 The hierarchy
Our results also show that the transfer is sensitive to the recipient’s position the
family hierarchy. A spouse position relatively lessens the impact of time on the
transfer. Its coeﬃcient is the highest (OLS: -0.64). They are followed by the
children of the household (OLS: -1.16) who, in their turn, are more favoured
than the spouses’ siblings (OLS: -1.54). Though one might be to drawn to
interpreting the children’s coeﬃcient as the sign of the main giver’s deeper
aﬀection, an explanation can be found in their age diﬀerence and, by extension,
in the intergenerational cycle (as in the mutualism model), that is to say the
recipient position in the solidarity chain.
The unemployed who are oﬀsprings of the head are 22 years old in average,
which is inferior their uncles’ and aunts’ average, 27 years. The former, generally
newly grads, receive much more assistance in their attempts to integrate the
labour market; their close ones mobilize as well their ﬁnancial resources as
their social networks (friends, colleagues, etc.) to help them. The latter, that
remained unemployed for a much longer period, ﬁnd their transfer amount much
more degraded by the time eﬀect. It can be said that their position in the
solidarity chain plays a role. They are closer to occupying a donor’s position;
their failure to do so can bring the donor to see them as unwilling to try hard
or to be less choosy between opportunities. The parameter µ might therefore
rise (in absolute while, remaining negative).
The age eﬀect may hold for the overextended family too, but their situation
is more complex. This group counts the cousins and nephews and nieces who
move from parental homes (villages, rural regions) to bigger town for high school
or university. Their situation tends to be closer the uncles’ and aunts’ because
their average age is 26 years, but their transfer is larger. The answer is in the
transfer they may also receive from the parents and other relatives in the same
town or from their direct relatives back home.
Although the heads of household were excluded from the regression (to avoid
perfect colinearity and also because they only make 16% of the sample), it is
necessary to shed a light on their position. Their transfers resist time better
than any other position. A ﬁrst explanation can come from the spouse’s sup-
port, which, when approached, turns out to come from prior savings, generated
by former jobs. A second element is the unemployment duration itself. The
household head responsibilities14, especially the expectation for him to provide,
exert a pressure on the consumption utility of the unemployment state. The
marginal utility of the consumption can easily increases, leading to a reduction
14Those responsibilities make it hard to keep an egoism postulate for the recipient when








































1the reservation wage and a lowering of the demanded conditions and, overall,
to a shortening the unemployment duration. The unemployment exit remains
nevertheless strongly tied to the individual’s characteristics (education, age, ex-
periences, etc.). The duration for ”head” that is 78 months lowers dramatically
when restricted to male ”heads” living in urban areas (65 months) because
unemployment is more likely to last for rural populations (less opportunities)
and women (discrimination). And it may not be erroneous to say that the ﬁg-
ure might be lower if the exits were counted (which we hope future surveys will).
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we can retain that the hypothesis of a simultaneous determination
of the inter vivos transfer and the unemployment duration holds in the Malian
case. The relationship between the two variables is negative : the transfer
decreases over the duration of the unemployment spell.
This assessment conforms to the common characterization of the reservation
wage because the trajectory of the transfer leads its decrease over the duration
of the unemployment spell, as concluded by many studies in the literature [we
can mention Kasper (1967), Kiefer and Neumann (1979, 1981), Van den Berg
(1990), Cases and Lollivier (1993) or Rioux (2001) who worked on the french
data]. In the studies on the developed countries, the decrease of the reserva-
tion wage can be linked to the policies on the unemployment beneﬁts because
their distribution is assigned to institutions and the decrease a term of that
distribution. Therefore there is an underlying ideas that, based on the relation-
ship between the reservation wage and the terms of the policies (the amount
of the beneﬁts and their duration), the policies can be adjusted and encourage
the job acceptances by the unemployed individuals. Lynch (1983), based on
the UK data, found that a 10% increase of the beneﬁts leads to a 1% increase
of the reservation wage and therefore to the lengthening of the unemployment
duration. On the US data, Moﬃtt (1985) estimated at 0.4 the unemployment
duration elasticity of the level of beneﬁts. The results obtained by Meyer (1990)
(US data) and Narendranathan et al. (1985) (UK data) converge in the same
direction: the unemployment duration lengthens when the unemployment ben-
eﬁts increase. When the beneﬁts duration increases, the outcome is the same.
Moﬃtt and Nickolson (1982) suggest that a week increase of that duration lead
to a 0.1 increase in the unemployment duration. Katz and Meyer (1990) found
an elasticity around 0.2 on the US data.
Though our results converge with those conclusions as for the nature of the
relationship between the reservation wage (in the partial non stationarity, the
transfer explain the reservation wage) and the unemployment duration, their
explanatory power as to the responsibility of the household support in the un-
employment condition is limited. That limitation due to the to the household
environment itself. In the presence of an institution, the reaction of the beneﬁts
to the duration is determined regardless of the job search strategies; the beneﬁt
decrease is contingent to the duration only. That may not be the case in the
household environment. Though we assumed a complete isolation of the donor’s
decision from the recipient’s strategy, many elements, especially the tests on the








































1prove that we did not completely apprehend the impact of the duration on the
transfer. That means the negative relationship between the transfer and the un-
employment duration may not systematically translate the responsibility of the
searcher in the unemployment duration nor exclude it. The donor’s income, for
instance, may be sensitive to the recipient’s status (the workers in the informal
sector most of the time mobilize labour supply of their oﬀspring), in which case
the decrease of the transfer will not necessarily translate a sanction by the donor
nor an attemp to prevent a moral hazard. The same way, we noticed that an
individual position in the hierarchy determines the stakes of employment and af-
fect their strategy. If the utility associated with an employment (because of the
position) is higher than the one associated with unemployment (the reservation
wage is inferior to the non labour income), then the duration stops reﬂecting
the job searcher’s behaviour. It may mean that the market opportunities are
too insuﬃcient. However, the duration may have more to do with the searcher’s
preferences than the market insuﬃciencies. To draw a line between the two
situations, there is a need for more studies, which we hope future surveys will
allow.
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1Table 1: Descriptives Statistics
Age Transfer Duration (1) Duration (2)
Variables (years) (FCFA) (months) (months)
Gender
Men 29.41 16,500 38.71 65.89
(1.86) (20,757.92) (32.71) (89.08)
Women 28.7 10,971.43 77.29 75.9
(10.27) (8,879.18) (85.70) (83.10)
Residence area
Urban 28.5 14,615.38 51.91 57.39
(10.41) (16,556.06) (54.71) (63.49)
Rural 30.67 11.194,44 75.58 82.31
(14.55) (14,828.2) (94.02) (98.63)
Job history
Previously worked 36.031 20,031.25 44.75 52.08
(12.31) (21,977.24) (39.34) (49.34)
Family hierarchy
Head of household 45.75 32,150 78 108.85
(9.24) (29,274.16) (91.91) (125.73)
Spouse of the ”head” 35.56 9,375 100.4 91.76
(10.19) (5,702.34) (91.52) (97.45)
Child of the ”head” 22.62 10,269.23 40.75 46.24
(5.88) (12,641.54) (29.88) (50.22)
Sibling of a spouse 26.33 6,166.67 38 60.05
(7.17) (2,401.39) (27.01) (43.14)
Extended family 26.34 12,609,76 49.05 51.47
(9.71) (8,610.69) (36.64) (40.16)
Household head’s professional status
Executive 25.3 11,700 27 27.66
(4.90) (5,034.33) (21.99) (22.91)
Middle management 28.2 29,000 33.6 56.79
(4.38) (14,317.82) (17.8) (49.03)
Upper level management 22 23,333.33 16 13.75
(6.56) (23,629.08) (6.93) (7.23)
Self employed 27.48 11,928.57 51.52 54.63
(10.15) (12,327.14) (40.5) (50.57)
Observations 140 140 140 359
Mean 29.06 13,735.71 58 71.41
(11.6) (16,147.08) (67.47) (85.86)
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 2: The household income and the unemployed individual’s environment
Correlation coeﬃcients
Variables ”Head’s” income Schooling years Size of the household









































1Table 3: Instrumented Regression of Transfers (ln(T)) on the Unemployment
Duration (ln(t))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables OLS dura. predict. aug equa. 2SLS GMM
Unemployment duration (ln) -0.116* -0.384** -0.436** -0.436** -0.392**
(0.0641) (0.190) (0.204) (0.216) (0.187)
Household labour income 1.18e-07 1.21e-07 1.44e-07 1.44e-07 1.58e-07**
(9.09e-08) (9.07e-08) (9.17e-08) (9.71e-08) (6.47e-08)
Household non labour income 1.08e-06** 8.69e-07* 1.35e-06*** 1.35e-06** 1.50e-06***
(4.82e-07) (4.80e-07) (5.06e-07) (5.35e-07) (2.86e-07)
Urban areas 0.631*** 0.631*** 0.522*** 0.522*** 0.496***
(0.155) (0.154) (0.168) (0.177) (0.183)
Men 0.267* 0.275* 0.0780 0.0780 0.129
(0.153) (0.151) (0.191) (0.202) (0.203)
Spouse of the “head” -0.635** -0.639** -0.552** -0.552** -0.672**
(0.255) (0.254) (0.258) (0.274) (0.274)
Child of the “head” -1.169*** -1.283*** -1.203*** -1.203*** -1.368***
(0.181) (0.191) (0.181) (0.192) (0.212)
Sibling of a spouse -1.538*** -1.680*** -1.529*** -1.529*** -1.646***
(0.341) (0.347) (0.339) (0.359) (0.294)
Extended family -0.764*** -0.799*** -0.850*** -0.850*** -0.941***
(0.200) (0.202) (0.206) (0.218) (0.243)
Unemployment rate (ln(Ua)) -0.250
(0.225)






Job in public administration -0.750*
(0.437)
Job in state owned ﬁrms -0.566*
(0.314)
Job in an NGO -1.370*
(0.715)
Job in small ﬁrms -0.217
(0.239)
Reason: wage too small 0.436*
(0.234)
Reason: tough market 0.520**
(0.246)
Constant 9.626*** 2.921*** 10.65*** 10.95*** 10.95*** 10.89***
(0.336) (0.599) (0.774) (0.869) (0.920) (0.810)
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
R











(3) Transfer equation with duration predicted values
(4) Transfer equation wit auxiliary equation residues
(5) 2 Stage Least Square Method (2SLS)
(6) Generalized Moments Method (GMM)
(6) GMM speciﬁcation with gender and location
Standard errors in parentheses








































1Table 4: 2SLS speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables OLS 2SLS 2SLS (Uj) 2SLS (Ua) 2SLS (Uaj)
Unemployment duration (ln) -0.116* -0.561** -0.328** -0.436** -0.410*
(0.0641) (0.244) (0.165) (0.216) (0.210)
Household labour income 1.18e-07 1.54e-07 1.35e-07 1.44e-07 1.42e-07
(9.09e-08) (1.04e-07) (9.21e-08) (9.71e-08) (9.58e-08)
Household non labour income 1.08e-06** 1.45e-06** 1.26e-06** 1.35e-06** 1.33e-06**
(4.82e-07) (5.78e-07) (5.00e-07) (5.35e-07) (5.28e-07)
Urban areas 0.631*** 0.479** 0.558*** 0.522*** 0.531***
(0.155) (0.192) (0.164) (0.177) (0.175)
Men 0.267* 0.00431 0.141 0.0780 0.0935
(0.153) (0.221) (0.178) (0.202) (0.198)
Spouse of the “head” -0.635** -0.519* -0.580** -0.552** -0.559**
(0.255) (0.294) (0.259) (0.274) (0.270)
Child of the “head” -1.169*** -1.216*** -1.191*** -1.203*** -1.200***
(0.181) (0.206) (0.183) (0.192) (0.190)
Sibling of a spouse -1.538*** -1.525*** -1.532*** -1.529*** -1.530***
(0.341) (0.385) (0.342) (0.359) (0.354)
Extended family -0.764*** -0.884*** -0.821*** -0.850*** -0.843***
(0.200) (0.235) (0.205) (0.218) (0.215)
Constant 9.626*** 11.47*** 10.51*** 10.95*** 10.84***
(0.336) (1.036) (0.715) (0.920) (0.894)
Observations 140 140 140 140 140
R
2 adjusted 0.309 0.0528 0.250 0.176 0.197
Wu-Hausman 4.78 1.98 2.73 2.38
(F) 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.13
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 5.00 2.11 2.90 2.53
(χ
2) 0.03 0.15 0.09 0.11
Sargan (S) 6.047 10.37 10.06 10.72
(χ
2) 0.534 0.240 0.261 0.218
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: GMM speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables GMM GMM (Uj) GMM (Ua) GMM (Uaj)
Unemployment duration (ln) -0.597*** -0.373** -0.392** -0.352**
(0.216) (0.173) (0.187) (0.176)
Household labour income 1.57e-07** 1.51e-07** 1.58e-07** 1.62e-07**
(6.55e-08) (6.73e-08) (6.47e-08) (6.50e-08)
Household non labour income 1.67e-06*** 1.48e-06*** 1.50e-06*** 1.46e-06***
(3.18e-07) (2.80e-07) (2.86e-07) (2.78e-07)
Urban areas 0.419** 0.489*** 0.496*** 0.498***
(0.189) (0.183) (0.183) (0.182)
Men 0.0222 0.131 0.129 0.149
(0.226) (0.189) (0.203) (0.197)
Spouse of the “head” -0.509 -0.618** -0.672** -0.679**
(0.311) (0.261) (0.274) (0.268)
Child of the “head” -1.262*** -1.286*** -1.368*** -1.363***
(0.230) (0.208) (0.212) (0.211)
Sibling of a spouse -1.551*** -1.584*** -1.646*** -1.642***
(0.321) (0.279) (0.294) (0.290)
Extended family -0.899*** -0.892*** -0.941*** -0.932***
(0.264) (0.229) (0.243) (0.239)
Constant 11.63*** 10.76*** 10.89*** 10.73***
(0.904) (0.757) (0.810) (0.774)
Observations 140 140 140 140
R
2 adjusted 0.00732 0.221 0.204 0.230
Hansen (J) 5.063 8.281 9.477 9.538
(χ
2) 0.652 0.406 0.304 0.299
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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